Abstract: Two game models are developed based on production costs and scope economies to investigate the widely observed multi-client outsourcing (MCO) phenomenon. Analytical results demonstrate that outsourcers' high in-house production costs and the advantage of scope economies motivate firms to outsource collectively to an independent vendor. Under certain conditions, if both firms make their outsourcing decisions simultaneously, collective outsourcing is one of the two equilibria; if both firms make decisions sequentially, collective outsourcing becomes the unique equilibrium. Furthermore, the comparative statics of the critical degree of scope economies are examined for the occurrence of MCO with regard to diverse market parameters. Finally, it is proved that market prices decrease as the degree of scope economies increases when MCO occurs. This research helps explain some widely observed phenomena such as malls, supply chain cities, and the China price.
Introduction
A value chain can usually be divided into several components such as design, manufacturing and marketing departments, with each handling a special (operational) function. However, it is not necessary for a firm to own all these functional departments. Instead, the firm may outsource one or more of these functions to an outside vendor. When two or more firms outsource to a same vendor, MCO (one vendor vs multiple clients) is observed (Sharma and Yetton 1996) , which is sometimes referred to as co-sourcing (e.g. Gallivan and Oh 1999) . Without causing confusion, we always use "firms" to represent companies that seek potential outsourcing opportunities and let "vendor" denote the company that provides outsourcing services.
MCO is widely observed in this era of increasingly competitive and globalizing economies. For example, firms in different industries turn their information systems over to relatively few computer companies such as IBM (Debbern et al. 2004) , and more and more firms now outsource their logistics needs, resulting in the rapid growing of the third party logistics business (Berglund et al., 1999; Steffansson, 2002) . Recently, the newly observed supply chain cities, located in Guangdong, China, can also be viewed as an outcome of MCO where several world-renowned apparel companies such as Polo Ralph Lauren, Liz Claiborne and Dillard's, and Fast Retailing outsource their production functions to Luen Thai Holdings Ltd. (Kahn 2004; Kusterbeck 2005 ). Even at the macro level, the observation that many multi-national companies in developed countries are moving their manufacturing facilities to developing countries such as China can also be treated as MCO.
Academia, business professionals, and even government officials have been extensively discussing the increasing trend of outsourcing manufacturing to China. As a direct consequence, products labeled both "Made in China" and a western brand are widely available in the marketplace and usually sold at a much lower price. The lower price is coined as "the China price" by Engardio et al. (2004) in a Business Week's special report. The China price implies that U.S. companies that manufacture in the United States must reduce their costs by at least 30 percent. Otherwise, they will lose their market to Chinese-made products.
Lower labor cost is considered as a classical account for the China price. However, Engardio et al. (2004) challenge this interpretation by pointing out that direct labor only contributes less than 10 percent of total costs for sophisticated electronics. Nevertheless, Chinese-made products still hold a considerable competitive advantage. To investigate other possible factors, Bhattacharya et al. (2004) empirically cite lower capital-investment costs, lower domestic-sourcing costs, greater economies of scale, and government incentives. Wu et al. (2006) argue that lower labor costs by themselves are not necessarily transformed into lower product prices. Following the idea of industrial clusters (Porter, 1998) , they propose that supply chain clusters play a central role in the transformation process, where most of the (vertically and/or horizontally) interrelated supply chain activities are geographically located nearby.
Porter (1998) claims that cluster members are entitled to utilize a "common glue" to realize extra economic values. The common glue takes the form of social networks (Porter 1998 ; Gordon and McCann 2000) , integrated knowledge (Morosini 2004) , input resources, and innovation incentive mechanisms, to name a few. In short, a cluster creates a common platform that facilitates its members to improve productivity.
If the common platform is provided and owned by an economic agent, it is reasonable to argue that the firms in a cluster are factually outsourcing to the agent and the nature of the cluster is simply an outcome of MCO.
From an economics perspective, the improvement of productivity via MCO can be interpreted in terms of both scope and scale economies: sharing and jointly utilization of inputs Willig1977, 1981; Bailey and Friedlaender 1982) . However, as all functions are unlikely to increase or decrease proportionally, the concept of ray scale economies is not applicable in a strict sense. Instead, scope economies are a more appropriate vehicle as it does not require proportional change of inputs. Therefore, we will investigate how firms take advantage of scope economies to improve productivity and examine the impact of MCO on market prices.
Consider two competitors who seek potential outsourcing opportunities and a vendor that possesses a technology characterized by a parameter representing the degree of scope economies to perform outsourced functions. Following the same idea of Cachon and Harker (2002) and van Mieghem (1999) , it is assumed that the vendor only provides outsourcing services and does not sell end-products to consumers directly. The vendor moves first to decide whether to offer an outsourcing service schedule to provide the contemplated outsourcing services. 1 Then the two firms move simultaneously (or sequentially) to make their outsourcing decisions of the make-or-buy type. Finally the two firms compete in a final market. In the game theory terminology, a three-stage (or four-stage) game model has been built and the concept of subgame perfect equilibrium will be employed to examine the game. cost-benefit analysis. The trade-offs between in-house production and outsourcing may theoretically be treated as comparison of agency costs among different information structures (Sridhar and Balachandran 1997) , of incentive effectiveness due to asset specificity (Chalos and Sung 1998), or of transaction costs based on two-sided informational asymmetry (Whang 1992 ). Osei-Bryson and Ngwenyama (2006) develop a system of practical methods and tools to quantify outsourcing risks and benefits and, then, to structure inventive contracts. To this end, the single-client framework has been well explored. However, very few formal studies address MCO even if it has been widely observed and conceptually analyzed by some authors. 3 Cachon and Harker (2002) , with a game model of two-firm full price competition under scale economies, prove that collectively outsourcing (resulting in a constant marginal cost) mitigates price competition and, then, makes both firms better off while in-house production with scale economies (resulting in a decreased average cost) raises price competition. They thus conclude that scale economies provide a strong motivation for outsourcing. Dube et al. (2007) examine a simpler version of Cachon and Harker (2002) where scale economies do not exist. They point out that the cost saving (the in-house production cost minus the outsourcing cost) drives firms to outsource. Our model focuses on examining another motivation: the combination of high in-house production costs and the advantage of scope economies. We try to explain the occurrence of MCO and investigate its impact on market prices. This model is different from that in Cachon and Harker (2002) in three aspects: Firstly, firms here compete in the final market through quantity rather than price. 4 Secondly, firms here attempt to proactively take advantage of scope economies via MCO while, in Cachon and Harker (2002) , firms tend to avoid their in-house scale economies by outsourcing to a vendor at a constant wholesale price so as to mitigate price competition. Thirdly, MCO leads to lower equilibrium prices in the final market if the degree of scope economies is high enough, while in Cachon and Harker (2002) , collective outsourcing drives equilibrium prices higher. The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents a dynamic game model to describe the economic situations under consideration. Section 3 reports the equilibriums of the game. Section 4 is devoted to refining the equilibriums. Section 5 provides some comparative statics about the refined equilibrium. Section 6 furnishes additional discussions on relaxing the firms' risk-neutral assumption to be risk-averse, and symmetric cost assumption to be asymmetric. Some concluding remarks are provided in Section 7.
The Model
Consider two firms (denoted by i and j, i, j = 1, 2), each of which has a similar but non-identical function and provides products or services to their consumers with (inverse) demand curves
where
represents the degree of substitution between product (or service) i and j , and Sharma and Yetton (1996) and Gallivan and Oh (1999) . 4 Competing on quantity or price is generally regarded as two alternative rules for market competitions. It is generally accepted that the latter is fiercer than the former. We take the milder one because it entitles us to explore more details about how MCO takes advantage of scope economies and leads to lower market prices. 5 Although a general linear demand function should take the form of
, our assumption of demand functions is equivalent to the general form if we appropriately manipulate the units used to measure currency, product i and product j . then the formation of supply chain cities) in terms of scope economies, we assume the two firms are symmetric in the sense that both the expectation and variance of their marginal costs are the same (i.e. is the vendor's random unit cost of separately serving firm i . To study outsourcing decision with the problem of managerial incentives, Chalos and Sung (1998) take the same assumption that the outsourcer is risk-neutral while the vendor is risk-averse. An empirical interpretation of this risk-neutral firms and risk-averse vendor assumption is that outsourcing firms tend to be larger corporations with diversified business while a vendor is more likely to be a specialized firm with limited diversification. Nevertheless, Section 6 relaxes the risk-neutrality assumption to allow the firms to be risk-averse so that the model may accommodate the case that firms are not so-well-diversified and, hence, share the risk-averse characteristic with the vendor.
In the base model, it is further assumed that Since the vender's production quantity is contingent upon firm i 's and j 's make-or-buy decisions, four cases are to be examined: Case 1. . Case 1 is trivial: the vendor's optimal production is simply not to produce at all. We ignore the trivial case and analyze the other three cases more carefully below.
With the concept of certainty equivalence, the vendor's profit-maximizing decision in case 2 can be
, it is not profitable for the firms to provide any product (or service) to consumers. 7 Here, i q ( 2 , 1  i ) should be understood as the quantity ordered by outsourcer i (i. e. the Cournot equilibrium quantity). , which remains valid up until Section 5 but will be relaxed in Section 6, the cost difference between the two firms (and then its impact on the market equilibrium) is excluded. Third,
implies the vendor operates in the same exogenous stochastic environment in terms of volatility as firm i (this assumption, once again, remains valid up until Section 5 but will be relaxed in Section 6). And finally, the independence assumption excludes the interaction of the exogenous stochastic impacts of the vendor's environment on the costs of serving both firms when they co-source. The overall purpose of these assumptions is to isolate scope economies from other factors and focus on the impact of scope economies on firms' outsourcing decisions. (2) and (3) imply that when firm j does not buy from the vendor, the purchasing cost of firm i is
In case 4, the "supply" curves are
In (4), the first term corresponds to the vendor's expected production cost while the second represents risk cost. Comparing (4) with firm i's in-house production cost function ( )
which is exactly the vendor's risk cost, where firm i chooses B and j selects M. In the presence of scope economies when both firms outsource to the vendor, the difference is
where the first term represents the production cost savings while the second term stands for the additional risk cost when both firms decide to outsource.
otherwise B is more cost-effective than M. For a given q i , the cost advantage/disadvantage essentially dictates the make-or-buy decision. This result is consistent with a well-known proposition that the difference of transaction costs determines the boundary of a firm (Coase 1937 , Williamson 1975 ). Next, we will relax this fixed market decision assumption and, then, introduce scope economies into a three-stage game model to investigate the make-or-buy decision under the condition of quantity competition in the final consumer market. The sequence of events is as follows. In stage 1, the vendor decides whether to offer the outsourcing service according to the cost function in (1). Then, firms i and j simultaneously make their make-or-buy decisions in stage 2, designated as the make-or-buy (MOB) game. 9 Finally, firms i and j compete against each other in the consumer market, named below as the market game. The whole decision process is referred to as O G .
The Equilibriums
Now the concept of sub-game perfect equilibrium is applied to analyze the three-stage game model by backward induction. First, we solve the market game to derive the payoff matrix for the MOB game. Clearly, the strategy profiles of the MOB game are {M, M}, {M, B}, {B, M} and {B, B} where the first and second element in a strategy profile refer to firm 1's and 2's strategy, respectively. For {M, M}, firm i 's ( 2 , 1  i ) market decision can be described as
In section 4, the two firms will make their make-or-buy decisions sequentially rather than simultaneously.
Then the market equilibrium quantity and payoff are
Similarly, from Eq. (5), the market equilibrium quantity and payoff for {B, B} are obtained as
With (2) and (3), the market equilibrium for {B, M} can be derived as
By symmetry, the market equilibrium for {M, B} can be similarly obtained as
and 2 2 * 2
Thus, the MOB game can be described as the following 2 2  matrix form. Table 1 The Normal-Form Make-or-Buy Game 
. As none of the two firms has incentive to deviate from their current strategy, {M, M} is a Nash equilibrium. The second part is straightforward. Lemma 1 is thus proved.
Lemma 1 shows that neither firm has the incentive to outsource if he/she anticipates that his/her opponent does not outsource. The reason is that the outsourcing firm has to bear an extra cost behavior (see (2) or (3)). In this case, any sole outsource increases the cost of the outsourcing firm, resulting in a competitive disadvantage in the final (differentiable) product market under quantity competition. This argument can also be applied to the situation where the firms are risk averse (see Section 6). Next, Proposition 1 below reveals that it is an important concern whether scope economies are realized via MCO when firms make their make-or-buy decisions. The reason is that (2) , (3) and (5) 
, it is easy to check under price competition. Here we explore the potential of scope economies to be an alternative motivation.
However, when in-house production costs are sufficiently low, regardless of the level of scope economies, both firms will choose M, thereby preventing the occurrence of MCO. Therefore, in-house production cost is an inalienable factor when we examine the emergence of MCO. such that MCO may occur. However, the property of this relationship is yet to be explored, and will be addressed in Section 5 when comparative static properties are examined. Secondly, because the MOB game has two Nash equilibriums, {M, M} and {B, B}, we can only conclude that it is possible that MCO occurs when both firms make their choices simultaneously. In Section 4, we will slightly modify the MOB game by allowing sequential moves by the two firms to refine the Nash equilibriums. Now we turn to the vendor's decision in stage 1. The vendor has two alternatives: Offer (O) and Not Offer (N) the outsourcing service schedule as characterized by (2) 
Refinement of the Equilibriums
Analytical results in Section 3 indicate that remains uncertain which one will come up as the final solution. On the other hand, the existence of these two equilibriums is related to the assumption of simultaneous moves. But in reality, firms seldom make their outsourcing decision simultaneously. In order to make our model more consistent with general business practice, we will refine the equilibriums of this subgame by assuming the two firms making sequential moves. 10 Due to the symmetry of the MOB game, without loss of generality, we assume that firm 1 moves first and firm 2 follows. The modified MOB game can be depicted in Figure 1 . The corresponding full game is named the modified outsourcing game and denoted by O G Proposition 2: Given the vendor's outsourcing service schedule described by (2) , (3) and (5) . It is easy to check that, for any k , (6) and (9) imply 10 Here the concept of subgame perfect equilibrium is employed to refine the Nash equilibriums obtained in Section 3. In game theory, there are other equilibrium concepts for refinement such as Bayesian perfect equilibrium, sequential equilibrium, perfect equilibrium, and proper equilibrium. However, these are not appropriate for our case as there is no information asymmetry in our model. Therefore, it is unnecessary to consider the equilibrium of beliefs that is the main concern of these concepts. 
. Now related partial derivatives of W are determined as follows. 
Proposition 3 is therefore proved.
Remark 3: Proposition 3 establishes that the critical value k 0 of scope economies for MCO to emerge increases as in-house production cost c increases. Note that the higher the value of k 0 , the lower the degree of scope economies. Hence, this result implies that a higher in-house production cost requires a lower critical degree of scope economies to foster the collective outsourcing result. Specifically, under the sequential-move assumption (a more reasonable description of real-world business settings), E2 becomes the unique subgame perfect equilibrium if k < k 0 and c > c 0 . This uniqueness provides a precise prediction of MCO. It should be stressed that both conditions, k < k 0 and c > c 0 , are required for E2 to be the unique subgame perfect equilibrium. For instance, if 0 c c  , Corollary 1 in Section 3 proves that E2 is not an equilibrium and, hence, cannot be a subgame perfect equilibrium here. Therefore, scope economies alone can not explain the occurrence of MCO. On the other hand, if there do not exist scope economies (i.e., 1
This means that for firm i , in-house production is always better than 11 It is assumed here that the changes are examined one at a time. For instance, when we investigate the relationship between 0 k and c, other parameter values are fixed and remain constant.
outsourcing regardless of its opponent's strategy. Then E2 would not be an equilibrium, either. These arguments demonstrate that the combination of a high in-house production cost (c > c 0 ) and a high degree of scope economies (k < k 0 ) motivates firms to collectively outsource to an outside vendor. Consequently, this combination should be recommended as an alternative motivation for the occurrence of MCO, in addition to Cachon and Harker's (2002) claim that scale economies is a motivation for MCO. However, the motivation differs. The model here suggests the firms to exploit the advantage of scope economies, but Cachon and Harker (2002) indicate that the firms give up their in-house scale economies by collectively outsourcing in exchange for a constant wholesale price, thereby mitigating price competition in the final market and making them both better-off. Furthermore, this result furnishes a reasonable account for Porter's "common glue" in industrial clusters (Porter, 1998) and, then, for the recently-observed phenomenon of supply chain cities (Kahn, 2004) . 
Proof: Eq. (7) indicates that the volume sold by firm , 1,2, i i  at the equilibrium {B, B} is clearly decreasing in k and then the equilibrium price 
where the last term in the objective function reflects the impact of the risk-aversion assumption.
For {M, B} and {B, M}, the firms' market decisions can be analogically revised. But the firms' decisions remain unchanged for {B, B}, as neither firm incurs in-house production cost. Following the similar procedures in Sections 3 through 5, Proposition 5 is derived. 
The symmetry of our model implies that severe. In the real business world, outsourcers (firms) tend to be large and diversified (sometimes, even publicly held) companies while suppliers (vendors) are often specialized and relatively small (sometimes, even privately owned) entities. As such, outsourcers are usually more capable of diversifying their investment than suppliers to reduce risk. Therefore, it is reasonable to assume that the degree of an outsourcer's risk aversion is lower (or at least, not much higher) than a supplier's. 12 Therefore, this observation can be viewed as an empirical justification of the condition ( , firms become risk-neutral and the aforesaid arguments obviously hold.
Asymmetric costs between firms
This subsection relaxes the assumption of We first obtain the market equilibrium variables as follows: The diversification argument for explaining the difference of risk attitude is also cited in the classical agency theory (Eisenhardt 1989 ) and its applications (e.g. Chalos and Sung 1998 
